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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
During the entire course(s) of appellant's representation 
on all previous"POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION(s)" the District 
Court appointed a total of seven (7) attorneys to litigate 
the procedures. Each and every appointed attorney provided 
noting more than "ineffective assistance of counsel" which 
resulted in appellant's POST-CONVICTION APPLICATIONS being 
subjected to "SUMMARY DISMISSAL" in violation of the appellant's 
constitutional rights under both the federal and state consti-
tutions. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13. 
on October 22,2013, the appellant filed his [prose] 
"SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION" and 
"MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF." 
On December 13,2013, the District eourt issued its "ORDER 
DENYING MOTION AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS" and "FINDINGS 
REGARDING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF." 
On December 30,2013, the appellant filed his [prose] 
"PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION." 
On January 5,2014, the Bistrict eourt issued its "ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" and "ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF." 
On January 23,2014, the appellant filed his [prose] 
NOTICE OF. APPEAL." 
APPELANT'S BRIEF 1 • 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's 
"PETITION FOR SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION?" 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's 
"MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL?" 
3. Did the district court err in dismissing·the appellant's 
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION?" 
4. Did the district court err in its determination the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of con-
viction with false evidence? 11 
5. Did the district court err in its determination the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of inef-
fective assistance,attorney misconduct, conflict of interest, 
and prejudice through appointed trial/defense counsel? 
6. Did the district court err in its determination the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of pro-
secutorial misconduct and subordinate perjury during the pro-
secution? 
7. Did the district court err in its determination the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of perjury 
by the state's make-or-break/star witness? 
8. Did the district court err in its determination the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of the 
state subjection of an unfair trial? 
2. 
9. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
·appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict of 
interest, and prejudice through appointed direct appeal coun-
sel? 
10. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of the 
state's destruction of physical evidence in bad faith? 
11. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflcit 
of interest, and prejudice through all seven (7) appointed post-
conviction relief counsel? 
12. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of 
waiver? 
13. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
appellant failed to bring his claims within his second or suc-
cessive post-conviction application within a timely manner? 
14. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
appellant failed amply litigate cumulative effect(s)? 
15. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
appellant failed to amply litigate fundamental error? 
16. Did the district court err in its determinations the 
3. 
to deny an evidentiary hearing at least -- in to the "waiver" 
rights? 
17. Did the district court err in its determinations on 
appellant's allegations without researching the court tran-
script(s)? 
18. Did the district court err in its determinations on a 
failure to litigate allegations that could have been brought 
in either [direct appeal] or [p]revious [post-conviction ap-
plications] -- regardless of the material fact that the appel-
lant alledged ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney mis-
conduct, conflict of interest, and prejudice from [all] ap-
pointed counsel(s)? 
19. Did the district court err in its determinations that 
the appellant failed to litigate any [new claims] that have never 
been [a]djudicated in a court of law -- regardless of the claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, con-
flict of interest, and prejudice from [all appointed counsel(s)] 
through the [direct appeal] and [post-conviction application(s)]? 
20 •. Did the appellant failed to bring his second or successive 
post-conviction application -- in a timely manner allotted by 
state law(s)? 
The appellant respectfully contends that these above twenty 
(20) issues/questions -- are indeed controlling constitutional 
issues.within litigation(s) of this case before the court. 
4. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. The appellant asserts that the reason(s) he failed to raise 
the issues contained within his "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POST-
CONVICTION APPLICATION" and "MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" was strictly due to the material and 
controlling factor(s) that -- all previously appointed counsel 
failed to litigate any of those issues which are now brought 
before either the district court, or this court. 
From [direct appeal] to all previous [post-conviction appli-
cations], the appellant suffered the inapt representation(s) 
from appointed counsel by the district court and not one single 
educated attorney has ever litigated the contained constitutional 
issues/violations which the appellant has strived to litigate 
before any court of law. 
Furthermore, not one single appointed attorney ever took the 
time or opportunity to [c]onsult with the appellant and [d]is-
cuss any issue(s) which the most meritorious argument(s) and it 
took the appellant (with the assistance of jailhouse~lawyers) 
months to actually uncover these most vital constitutional 
issues and violations which the appellant has {now) attempted 
to bring to light before any court of law in the state of 
Idaho. 
None of the strong issues which previous co.unsel [omitted] 
were ever "waived" by the appellant, let alone "discussed" 
with appellant at any time(s) during the course(s) of repre-
sentation(s). 
s. 
The appellant respectfully asserts that "just the claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict 
of interest, and prejudice" displayed from [all] appointed 
attorneys -- combined with the constitutional ciaim(s) of being 
"convicted with false evidence" would amply suffice to warrant 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 
The omission(s) of vital constitutional violations were never 
-- an active, or knowing choice made by the appellant through any 
appointed attorney, and would lawfully provide 1sufficient reason( s) 
for permitting the newly asserted allegations contained throughout 
his POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF, and all attached EXHIBITS -- to be raised 
in the instant course(s) of (prose) litigation. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of [appellate counsel] 
coupled with ineffective assistance of prior [postconviction 
counsel] -- provides sufficient reason(s) to permit newly 
asserted (prose) allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-
conviction proceeding. Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 
P.2d 955 (1984). 
Prior to dismissing petition for postconviction relief, 
district court [is required] to [o]btain portion to trial tran-
script(s) as is [necessary] to [d]etermination on the [b]asis 
of [application], answer or motion, and [record], that there 
are [n]o [material issues of fact] and that petitioner is [not] 
entitled to postconviction relief. I.e. §19-4906(b). Matthews 
v. State, 1992, 122 Idaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215. Const. Art. 1,§13; 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. (emphasis in original). 
Issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but 
6. 
was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in postconviction 
proceedings, [u]nless it appears to court that asserted basis 
for relief raises substantial doubt about the reliability of 
finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, 
have been presented earlier. I.C. §19-4901(b). Gonzales v. State, 
1991, 120 Idaho-759, 819 P.2d 1159; Hedger v. State, 1993, 124 
Idaho 49, 855 P.2d 886. 
Appellant respectfully asserts that at no time(s), did any 
[appointed counsel] ever bring to light or the_ attention of the 
appellant (either on direct appeal, or on postconviction applica-
tion( s-)) that: 
1 .) Appellant was provided with [nothing] but [i]neffective 
assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict of interest, 
and prejudice under the Strickland standards, ~swell as, 
2.) Appellant was unconstitutionally [co"nvicted] with [f]alse 
testimony/evidence under the Giglio and Napue standards. (see 
also I.R.P.C. RULES - 1 .3. Diligence & Commentary [1 ]; 1 .4. Com-
munication & Cmmentary [11,[5]&[7] and see 1 .0. Terminology -
Commentary - Informed Consent [6],[7] (emphasis in [6] " ..•. , a 
lawyer who does not personally [inform] the [client] or other 
person ]assumes] the risk that the client or other person [is] 
[I]nadequately -- [i]nformed and the [consent] is [invalid]." 
Therefore, while ordinarily a client is bound by the attorney's 
actions, an [attorney] may [not -- waive] a [fundamental right] 
of the [client] -- [without the client's informed -- consent]. 
Const. Art. 1,§13; u.s.c.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; State v. Lapage, 
1981, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674, cert. denied 102 s.ct. 606, 
454 U.S. 1057, 70 L.Ed.2d 595; I.R.P.C. 1.0. - Commentary;-
Informed Consent [6]&[7]. (emphasis in originals). 
7. 
II. FALSE TESTIMONY, FALSE EVIDENCE, PERJURY, and SUBORDINATE 
PERJURY. 
In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 
1217 (1959) the Court held "a conviction obtained through use of 
false evidence, known to be such by the representatives of the 
State, [must fall] under the Fourteenth Amendment." Napue, 360 
U.S. at 269. "A claim under Napue will succeed when '(1) the 
testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution 
knew or should have known that the testimony was actually [false], 
and (3) the [false testimony] was [material]." It is "irrelevant 
whether the defense knew about the false testimony and failed to 
object or cross-examine the witness, because the defendant Ycan 
[not waive a freestanding ethical and constitutional obligation] 
of the prosecutor as a representative of the government to protect 
the integrity of the court and the crimi'nal system." The same re-
sult obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evi-
dence, allows it to go [uncorrected] when it appears. Id.,at 269. 
(emphasis in original). 
In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112, 55 s.ct. 340,342, 79 
L.Ed. 791 (1935) the Court made clear that "deliberate deception 
of a [court] and [jurors] by the prosecution of known false evi-
dence is incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice'." 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; const. Art. 1,§13. (emphasis in ori-
ginal). 
Appellant asserts that -- during the litigation (attempts) of 
his [prose] SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION 
arguments were (attempted to be) made alleging the conviction 
through false testimony/evidence and during the litigation (at-
tempts) of his [prose] MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF -- additional . 
8. 
arguments were (attempted to be) made alleging supportive claims 
to the conviction with false evidence/testimony ( see MEt10RANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPO~T OF POST-CONVICTION RELIBF, pp. 17-47; 66-203; 
217-225). 
Appellant also alleged throughout his [prose] pleadings how 
"at no time, did the prosecution, advisory witnsss {state), nor 
defense counsel ever -- move to [enter] the POLICE REPORTS, 
MEDICAL REPORTS, or STATEMENTS into evidence and either 'direct 
examine' or 'cross-examine' the state's make-or-break/star 
witness before the [court] or [jury] over all of her inconsis-
tencies compared to [eJvidence gathered during previous course(s) 
of investigation procedures." 
The POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, ST~TEMENTS (witnesses), 
and further EXHIBITS were attached to the.MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICITION RELIEF and the distri.ct court clearly 
disregarded such allegations, or sripportive evidence while 
DISMISSING the appellant's SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION 
APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF pleadings. 
The appellant asserts that there are at least two (2) lawful 
controlling matters to the above allegations: 
1 .) The Supreme Court has held" ••• we may use (appellant's) 
brief (MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF) 
to clarify allegations in (his) complaint (POSTCONVICTION APPLI-
CATION) whose meaning is unclear." Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 
211,230, 120 s.ct. 2143,2155, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 c2000). 
2.) The appellant asserts that "where the state's [a]dvisory 
witness (whom was in fact the primary police investigation(s) 
officer of the ·alleged crime) sits in the courtroom listening to 
9. 
any and all testimony from the state's make-or-break/star witness 
(and all other testimony) and also [compiled] pertinent evidence 
from the state's make-or-break/star witness and holds personal 
knowledge that indeed the state's make-or-break/star witness [is] 
testifying falsly, as an agent/representative of the prosecution's 
team, this very same advisory witness (state's) owes the couri, 
the jury, and the appellant the constitutional duty to -- notify 
the prosecutor or anyother representative of the court and jury 
to -- confrontation against the state's make-or-break/star wit-
ness and assist either the prosecution -or- defense counsel in 
impeaching the [witness] for testifying falsely and openly com-
mitting perjury before the court and jury. see I.R.E. 615(a)(3); 
State v. Ralls, 111 Idaho 485, 725 P.2d 190 (1986); Labelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 937 P.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997). Const. Art. 
1,§13; u.s.c.A. Const. Amend. 14. see also I.e.§§ 18-5401, 18-, 
5407, 18-5409, 18-5412, 18-5413, and 18-5414. see also MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, pp. 24(~1), 29(TI~ 
1-2), 75, 105-106(ff1) ,and MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, pp.12(ff2), 
13(ffff3&4), 15(1.-5), 19(ff2), 22(ffff3-4), 27(ffff3-4) . 
. "A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in 
any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the re-
sponsibility and [duty] to [correct] what he knows to be [false] 
and elicit the [truth]." Mariana Islands v. bowie, 243 F.3d 
1109,1115 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Napue, 360 U.S., at 269-270). 
Appellant clearly alleged to the district court that "indeed 
the- prosecutor, advisory witness (state's), and defense counsel 
[h]ad in their [p]ossession(s) -- all relevant POLICE REPORTS, 
MEDICAL REPORTS, and STATEMENTS (from material eye witnesses) 
and thereby held firsthand knowledge that the state's make-or-
break/star witness was indeed -- committing perjury and providing 
false testimony to both the court and jury. 
1 0. 
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, pp. 
22-29, 104-121, 162TI2-225; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, pp. 5fffi 
3-4, 12ffff1-2, 15ff3, 19ff2, 22H2-23ff2, 24-32). 
Appellant asserts that "at no time did the district court 
take in to consideration that the appellant was contending that 
he was convicted through false evidence/testimony and absolutely 
none of the representatives of the law bothered to lawfully do 
anything about this unconstitutional matter." 
Yet, the district court DISMISSES THE ACTION. 
The appellant respectfully asserts that the POLICE INVESTIGA-
TION REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS,. STATEMENTS (material eyewitnesses) 
were indeed lawfully BRADY violations on the part(s) of the pro-
secutor.and the adivisory witness (state's) .and indeed were also 
"MATERIAL" evidence in the defense of the appellant. Thereby, 
the state violated the appellant's constitutional rights under 
the clearly established laws of Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
131 L.Ed.2d 490, 115 s.ct. 1555 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 105 s.ct. 3375; Napue v. Illinois, 
360 u.s. 264, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 79 s.ct. 1173 (1959); Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 u.s. 668, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166, 124 s.ct. 1256 (2004); 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 
(1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 
92 s.ct. 763 (1972). (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF,pp. 162-225). (emphasis in pleading). 
Furthermore, the appellant asserts that "where defense counsel 
plays an active role in the suppression of exculpatory and 
material evidence, defense counsel surely must have violated 
his client's (appellant's) constitutional rights under the 
11 • 
clearly established law(s) from the Supreme Court under the 
Strickland standards, as well as, the IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT. Rules PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES - [2] ''as 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under 
the rules of the adversary system.", [9] " .•• These principles 
include the lawyer's obligations, as an advocate, to zealously 
protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests within the· 
bounds of the law and, as an officer of the court, to preserve 
the integrity of the legal system's search for the truth while 
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward 
all persons involved in the process." (emphasis in originals). 
see also, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, 
PP. 231-2411, 29~30111-3, 1.05-10611. (emphasis in pleading). 
Had either the prosecutor, advisory witness (state's), or 
appella~t's defense counsel presented the POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL 
REPORTS, STATEMENTS (eyewitnesses), etc. to the court or jury 
and moved to IMPEACH the state's make-or-break/star witness --
there would surely, have been a different [o]utcome of the trial 
and unconstitutional conviction the app~ll~nt has been forced to 
endure all of these years behind prison walls & fences. 
Never -- has the Supreme Court, or the State Supreme Court held 
that both the prosecution and defense counsel can "suppress 
exculpatory and material evidence from the defendant, the court, 
or the jury and obtain any conviction through the useage of a 
state's make-or-break/star witness' false testimony and false 
evidence." 
Yet, the record clearly reflects this. 
And the district court DISMISSES this action as well. 
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Appellant further asserts the district court based one of its 
determinations on a single allegation that the litigant was 
attempting to "relitigate the issue that the state's make-or-
break/star witness only testified [falsely] on 'how much alcohol 
she consumed'." (see FINDINGS REGARDING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL ON SECOND OR SECCESSIVE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RE 
LIEF,p.2(f[3) -- "As a further example, the petitioner reiterated 
his prior claims regarding the amount of alcohol the victim had 
consumed on the night of the incident .... "). 
However, had the district court referred to the [c]umulative 
[new] allegations/claims contained throughout the MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, there lies an [abundance] 
of additional allegations/claims which absolutely [no] appointed 
counsel (in either the direct appeal -or- previous postconviction 
application(s)) ever bothered to raise before any court(s). 
Those add~tional controlling constitutional allegations/claims 
entailed the following [i]nconsistent matters: 
(a.) The state's make-or-break/star witness testified before 
the court(s) and [jury] that ~[SJhe [never] left Chiller'~ Bar the 
entire day/night and she only [c]onsumed two (2) Bloody Marys the 
[entire time]." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.32(,t19), 46(,tS), 119(,tI.), 122(,t2), 91 
[questions & answers]); see also TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS,p.335,Ls.7-
1 0) ) • 
However, there is indeed, material and inculpatory evidence 
which was gathered by the police investigator(s) that lawfully 
(disputes] this controlling untruthful matter/factor. (see 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.21 (,t4), 
30(,t,t2&4),77(B.)-80(,t1),87,89-91 {questions & answers),93-95,110 
(,t,t3&4),114(A.),142(d.),144(,t,t2-3),205(2)(emphasis on ,rs). 
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(b.). The state's make0or0break/star witness clearly testified 
before the court(s) and [jury] to numerous inconsistent versions 
of how "[S)he [exited the vehicle] after arrival at the residence." 
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.24 
(~),28,100(A.-C.),152(10.)-159(i.),161(6.),164(ff4)-169(1.),171-174, 
1 a 1 < m11 -s , , 1 91 < n g. > , 1 9 s > • 
The appellant asserts that "there cannot be so 'many various ,and 
inconsistent versions' --to-- one (1) single event." Therefore, 
which version is the [jury] to believe as the [truth} and which 
remaining version was the [lie]? The Supreme Court has never held 
that a single witness may provide various and inconsistent testi-
mony/evidence and this pertinent constitutional violation(s) will 
be -- overlooked. Napue, 360 I.S., at269-270. (emphasis in original). 
(c.) The state's make-or-break/star witness clearly testified 
before the court(s) and [jury] on how "[S]he received a phone call 
from her [husband] while in route to the residence." (see MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.23(ff8.)-24(ff1),32(ff 
18~),37(24.),66(ff5)-68,96-99(ffff1-3),139,145-147,150(ffff1-3). 
The appellant clearly litigated to the district court that "This 
/~--
particular event/incident proclaimed-~ si virtually [i]mpossible, 
" ./ yet, defense counsel never once bothereato [fully investigate] 
the claimer, or even [subpoena] the proclaimed [husband] to testify 
before the court and [jury] on said incident." 
Again "A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it 
is in [any way] relevant to the case, the district attorney [has] 
the responsibility and [duty] to [correct] what he knows to be 
[false] and [elicit the truth]." Bowie, 243 F.3d at 1115; Napue, 
360 U.S., at 269-270. (emphasis in original). U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 
14; Const. Art. 1,§13. 
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Appellant respectfully asserts that there are [numerous] other 
[false testimony/evidence] contained throughout the MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF which the district court 
elected to [not] take into consideration before making the deter-
mination(s) to "Deny" -- APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL and SECOND OR 
SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and further DISMISSED all 
pleadings presented (prose) for adjudication on the [merits]. 
Where the district court is [required] to [refer] to the alle-
gations/claims and transcript(s) on record in the determination(s) 
of lawful proceedings, the actions of the district court must 
surely support the [opposite]. Const. Art. 1,§13; u.-s.c.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held "It is the duty of the prose-
cutor to see that a defendant [has a fair trial], and that nothing 
but [competent evidence] -- is -- submitted to the [jury]." State 
v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,44, 71 P. 608,611 (1903). They should not 
"exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trepass 
upon the verge of error, because generally in so doing they trans-
gress upon the [rights of the accused]." Id. see also State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469, 163 P.3d 1175,1181 (2007). 
(emphasis in original). Const. Art. 1,§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 
1 4. 
Appellant respectfully asserts that the [pleadings] filed before 
the district court in his SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION 
APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF allege numerous claims on the [incompetent] evidence that 
was unlawfully used in the trial and eventual conviction and at 
no time(s) did the district court address any of those pertinent 
unconstitutional matters. 
1 5. 
III. BRADY VIOLATION(S). 
The appellant asserts that throughout all of his pleadings 
filed before the district court contained numerous allegations/ 
claims of the unconstitutional BRADY violations which he was 
forced unconstitutionally to suffeL from the hands of both the 
prosecutor and state's advisory during the course(s) of his 
trial and eventual conviction. 
The appellant argued before the district court that "where 
the state's [advisory witness] was ·indeed the primary police 
investigator in the alleged crime(s) and constructed the report 
that contained the most [i]nculpatory evidence on the state's 
make-or-break/star witness -- and the most [e]xculpatory evi-
dence for the benefit of the defendant/appellant and where the 
state's [advisory witness] [sat] befo~e the court and jury knowing 
full well that the state's make-or-break/star witness was pro-
viding nothing more than ffalse testimonyj in order to create the 
[evidence], said advisory witness [owed] the defendant/appellant 
the [duty] to bring this unlawful matter to the attention(s) of 
the prosecutor, the court, and the [jury] -- and to assist in the 
IMPEACHMENT of the state's make-or-break/star witness is a lawful 
representative of the prosecutions team and under clearly estab-
lished law( s). '.: ( see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.75fffl3-6)-203 [especially p.75(ffff2-5) to 
203]). see also Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486,507-508 (9th Cir. 
2010); Hall v. Director of Corrections, 343 F.3d 976,978,984-985 
(9th Cir. 2003); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,1209 (9th Cir. 
2002)(~Finding prejudice where perjured witness 'was the make-
or-break witness for the state' .")(emphasis in original). 
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Therefore, where both _the.prosecutor and the state's make-or-
break/star witness orchestrates [perjury]-and [subordinate per-
jury] in the presence of the state's [advisory witness]; as a 
member of the prosecution 1's team, both, the prosecutor and advi-
sory witness are active participants in the unlawful and uncons-
titutional acts of "suppressing [material] evidence" in violation 
of clearly established law(s) under the BRADY and KYLES standards. 
Yet, the district court elected to not address this constitutional 
controlling matter, which would more than fu~velmet the criteria of 
[new claims]. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 s.ct. 1555, 131 
L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 u.s. 83, 83 s.ct. 1194, 
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art~ 1,§13. 
The record(s) of all proceedings and filed pleadings to this 
case would lawfully reflect that [n]o competent attorney which was 
[appointed] to represent the defendant/appellant ever bothered 
.J/ 
one time to rai$e- and of the BRADY -or- KYLES violation(s) in the 
manner which the appellant (and two (2) jailhouse lawyers) has-d0ne 
as a [prose] litigant uneducated in the skills and art of 
litigation(s). Had either the prosecutor, the state's advisory 
witness, or even defense counsel brought it to the attention(s) of 
the court ~nd [jury] that the state's make-or-break/star witness 
was indeed --_providing [false testimony] iri order to create pre-
judicial evidence against the defendant/appellant and lawfully 
sought to [IMPEACH] the state's make-or-break/star witness, there 
most certainly would have been a different outcome in the prose-
cution and conviction of the defendant/appellant, for there would 
have been [no other] "evidence" but an [u]ntested alleged rape kit 
sample which the defendant asked his defense counsel on several 
ocassions to "test the rape kit" and was [assured] that feat [would 
be done] •.. which [never was]. see Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 
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139 P.3d 741 (Ct. App. 2006); State v~ Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 
958 P.2d 22 (1998); Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944 (C.A. 9 
2009). Const. Art. 1,§13; Const. mend. 14. 
The appellant asserts that even before the trial began, both 
the prosecutor and advisory witness, as well as, defense counsel 
[had in their possession(s)], a clear and exact copy of all of 
the Police Reports, Medical Reports, and Statements from Material 
eyewitnesses, thus holding firsthand knowledge of the contents 
within all Discovery material, yet, the record clearly supports 
the allegation(s)/claim(s) that each.arid eveiyone of these repre-
sentatives of the law -- sat in the courtroom as the state's make-
or-break/star witness provided [false testimony] in order to create 
the [evidence] to convict ••• each and everyone of the represen-
tatives of the law -- ''kept their mouths [shut] as the show-went-
on." 
Thereby, creating the cumulative effects of BRADY, KYLES, 
STRICKLANDi~~ •. NAPUE, GIGLIO, and BAGLEY violations of established 
standards -- and the district court elected to DISMISS the action. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor, advisory witness, and defense couns~l 
also violated the IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT in their_ 
roles of [representatives] of clearly established [law(sl]. Const. 
Art. 1§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14. 
Appellant asserts that the above Police Investigation(s),Reports, 
Medical Reports, and Statements (from material eyewitnesses) 
clearly· satisfy the first two requirements of Brady: they are 
"favorable to the accused because [they are] •.. impeaching," 
and theyclearly have been [suppressed] py both the State and 
Defense Counsel,- either willfully or inadvertently. 11 Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 u.s. 263,281-82, 119 s.ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 
(1999)(Brady applies not only to information known to the prose-
cutor, but also to ''evidence 'known only to police [investigators] 
1 8. 
/ 
and not the prosecutor.'" Id. at 280-81 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419,438, 115 s.ct. 1555, 13J L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). With 
respect to the [first Brady requirement], the above material 
evidence are classic·examples to [impeachment] evidence. With 
respect to the [second Brady Requirement], both the [prosecutor 
and advisory witness] undoubtly [suppressed] the evidence from 
the court and jury, as well as, the appellant. Under the Napue 
standards, both the prosecutor and advisory witness owed not only 
the court and jury, but also, the appellant to disclose any and 
all evidence that exposes the state's make-or-break/star winess 
is unlawfully providing [false testimony] and creating [false 
evidence] and the record clearly supports the material factor(s) 
that "at no time did any representative of the state disclose the 
impeachment material to either the couit and jury -or- appellant. 
during~Jany course ( s) of prosecution. 11 
Defense counsel owed the appellant the duty bf [disclosure] on 
all discovery material which is lawfully essential to the meaning-
ful defense to allegations thrusted upon him by both the state 
and its make-or-break/star witness, and defense counsel owes the 
appellant the constitutional duty to [zealous representation] 
under clearlj established law(s) and both federal and state cons-
titutions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 s.ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) see also IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1 ,§13. 
Appellant respectfully asserts that the errors may not be pre~ 
judicial standing alone, therefore, this court must "consider 
all of the Napue and Brady violations [collectively] and ask 
whether 'there is a [reasonable probability] that ... the result 
of the trial proceedings would have been different. 
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Appellant respectfully asserts that though the' Brady standards 
apply to the state's actions, surely, Strickland, the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the American Bar Association 
Stabdards (ABA) 4-4.1 must enstill a constitutional obligation 
upon any defense counsel who acts as the state's [adversary]. 
see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,332n.13, 325, 102 S.Ct. 
445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (198J); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057,1079 
C.A. 9 2008); State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 660 P.2d 934 
(1983). 
Appellant respectfully asserts ''It wai [error] for the district 
court to [dismiss] the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLI-
CATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
where [numerous] factual and material allegations/claims clearly 
exist in the case, including a question whether there was indeed 
[false testimony] which would be discoverable had the district 
court taken the effort to study and research the trial records 
and evidence pertinent to appellant's prosecution." Goodrich, 104 
Idaho at 472; Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148,157, 177 P.3d 362, 
371 (2008). (emphasis in originals). U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6, 
1 4 ; Const. Art. 1 , § 1 3 . 
Appellant further asserts that the prosecution and conviction 
he was subjected to suffer was infested with [fundamental errors] 
and the distri6t court surely make its determinations that such 
violations were "harmless" and "failed to state a claim." 
However, the standard for determining whether error of consti-
tutional dimension is "harmless," as set forth in Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, ,87 s.ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is 
"that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, 
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was tharmless] 
-- beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24, 87 s.ct. at 828. 
Although the harmless error standard in Chapman is clearly app-
l~cable to claimed violations of the other constitutional rights, 
20. 
the harmless error standard in Chapman is clearly applicable to 
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel. 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 s.ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 
426 (1978); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 u.s. 371, 92 s.ct. 2174, 
33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498,507, 616 P.2d 
1043 (1980). u.s.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13. 
(emphasis in original). 
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the 
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the 
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which 
was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to 
permit him to waive and error which" so profoundly distorts the 
trial that it produces [manifeat injustice] and [deprives] the 
accused of his [constitutional right] to [due process;" State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,281, 77 P.3d 956,970 )2003);State v. Kenner, 
121 Idaho 594,597, 826 P.2d 1306,1309 (1992). An error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclµde, based on the 
evidence and argument presented during the trial, that the jury 
would have reached the same result [absent] the error. State v. 
Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003); State v. Chris-
tiansen, 144 Idaho 463,470, 163 P.3d 1175,1182 (2007). 
Appellant respectfully asserts that "it would border on the 
absurd to say that the jury ignorea the [false testimony] in 
arriving at the~~-decision had either the prosecutor, state's 
advisory witness, or defense counsel confronted the state's 
m~ke-or-break/star witness with the police reports, medical reports, 
or even the contents in the material eyewitnesses statements that 
did not corroborate the testimony given before the court and jury. 
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Appellant asserts that ''If the district court would have taken 
the effort to [compare] the statements contained within the POLICE 
REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, and STATEMENTS (material eyewitnesses), 
the court would clearly have come to the conclusion(s) that 
there was absolutely [nothing] the state's make-or-break/star 
witness stated to POLICE INVESTIGATORS, MEDICAL PERSONNEL, or 
what the [material eyewitnesses] stated to POLICE INVESTIGATORS 
that corroborate what she was testifying to before the trial 
court and jury. There are also inconsistent testimony throughout 
the trial transcript(s) that completely contradicts the state's 
make-or-break/star witness from time-to-time. 
Case in point -- "How many different versions can on~ witness 
provide to the jury just on 'how she exited the vehicle after' 
arrival at the residence?" There was never any testimony -or-
evidence produced that reflected -- the victim left the vehicle, 
then the victim was placed---back -- in to the vehicle in order 
to be [removed] in so many different occurrences. Surely; an 
individual can only exit a vehicle one (1) time, if not placed 
[back in] the same vehicle. Furthermore, the very same make-
or-break/star witness informed POLICE INVESTIGATORS that ''she 
walked iri to the house~ then before the court and jury, there 
are inconsistent versions on ''how she got in to the alleged 
place of the assault(s).~ 
Apparently neither the trial judge, the jury, the prosecutor, 
advi~ory witness, or defense counsel gave very much [attention] 
to the testimony that was actually given by the state's make-
or-break/star witness. Surely, the trial transcripts speak 
volumes on false testimony to create evidence. 
22. 
False statement usually will be ''materialu for purposes of 
supporting perjury charge if it is material to any proper point 
of inquiry and is calculated and intended to [bolster testimony] 
of the witness on some material point or to [support] or attack 
his/her credibility, even though it does not bear directly on 
ultimate issue of fact. I.e. §18-5401. State v. McBride, 1992, 
123 Idaho 263, 846 P.2d 914. P·erson making material statements 
to officers [is] presumed to tell truth, and his/her denial of 
making such statements may justify [perjury] conviction. I.C. 
§18-5401. State v. Terry, 1931, 50 Idaho 283, 295 P. 427; 
IV. TROMBETTA VIOLATION(S). 
The appellant asserts that throughout his [prose] MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF and SECOND OR SUC-
CESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, he (appellant) argued 
allegations/claims on the "state's [destruction] of physical 
evidence" while under [notice to preserve] said evidence for the 
"defendant was 'expected to exhaust his post-conviction remedies' 
after the adjudication on his direct appeal." (see MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.48-65)(see also 
attached exhibits G.,H., and J.). 
Appellant respectfully asserts that nothinq but [competent 
evidence] is to be submitted to the [iury] under clearly estab-
lished law and the constitution. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,44. Thereby, 
the [only] controlling matter that made the [rape kit] competent 
evidence was, the mouth of the state's make-or-break/star wit-
ness and the contorlling material fact that neither the state 
nor defense counsel eve~ bothered to submit the stntP's alleoed 
evidence to the statA's crime laborato~v for RDV tvpA(s) of 
23. 
; 
Forensic tPstinrr(s). HowPver. the state ana defense counsel iust 
tonk the word of a clear fiuntruthfull self-nroclai~ed victim and 
the doctor who oroclaimed that "He saw one (1) sinale soerm in thA 
sample taken from the alleged victim while at the hospital." 
The above factors do not make the alleged [rape kit sample/ 
sperm] ... competent evidence. There never was any competent 
evidence presented at the trial that the sperm sample indeed came 
from the defendant/appellant. 
Factually, defense counsel (Brad Chapman) knew full well that 
his client outright "denied" having sexual intercourse with the 
proclaimed victim and khew full well for months that there was 
indeed a man in the community who was willing to be investigated, 
provide a deposition/statement that "He, was in fact a sexual 
partner to the (alleged) victim" and defense counsel did absolutely 
nothing about this material and vital information. 
Defense counsel knew full well exactly what the al~eged victim 
was going to be testifying to during trial proceedings and knew 
that the alleged victim was going to testify that "[S]he has not 
has 'sexual intercourse' for two (2) years" thereby, forcing 
the assumption that the defendant/appellant [must be the source 
of the sperm sample]. 
Thereby, making the alleged [sperm sample/rape kit] a most 
vital and controlling piece of physical evidence. The importance 
of the physical evidence was established not only because the 
self-acclaimed victim was claiming that she was [raped], but, 
both the state and alleged victim were claiming that ''The victim 
was 'slipped a date rape drug in her drink(s) while at the bar 
and the defendant/appellant was the source of such conduct'~" 
Making the physical evidence a controlling piece of material 
evidence and neither the state -or- defense counsel bother to 
24. 
subject the alleged evidence to a Serology test, but also, a 
Toxicology test as well for determination(s) On if ~n fact the 
alleged victim "was slipped a 'date-rape-drug' causing such in-
toxication" as being proclaimed by the state with absolutely no 
evidence to support their theory. 
The record supports the material fact(s) that the state claimed 
a "date-rape-drug" and argued such factor to the jury. Therefore, 
the physical evidence was indeed [material] to the defendant/ 
appellant. Furthermore "It is the [duty] of the prosecutor to see 
that a defendant has a fair trial. The desire for success should 
never induce him/her to obtain a verdict by argument based on any-
thing except the [evidence] in the case and the conclusions legi-
timately [deducible] from the law applicable to the same·." State 
v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394,408, 253 P.2d 203,211 (1953); State v. 
Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163,168, 610 P.2d 522527 (1980). (emphasis 
in original). Const. Art. 1,§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. 
Appellant asserts that "If defense counsel would have [paid 
attention] to both the [evidence] from the discovery material and 
the [testimony] during trial proceedings, counsel would have ad-
duced the following constitutional factors:" 
1.J The state's make-or-break/star witness testified that 
"She only [had} two (2) Bloody Marys the [entire] evening." 
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.19 
( 2. ) • 
2.) The state's make-or-break/star witness testified that 
"She drank [both] drinks while [sitting] at the bar." (see 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.32(n3, 
(19.)), 33(,T2), 39(,T2,27.), 115-116, 119(,T5,I.), 120(1.-3.)). · 
3.) The prosecutor was arguing/alleging that a "date-rape-drug 
was [slipped] iri to the alleged victim's [drink] by the defendant/ 
appellant." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION 
25. 
RELIEF,pp.38(nn1&c26.>-n3), 39(nn1-(27.)), 41 <nn2-3&(31.), 42 
(n~1-2), 82(n2-(A.)), 91(questions&answers), 92(n3), 112(nn2-3), 
115-117, 119(1.)-120(3.)). (empasis in pleading). 
and most importantly 
4.) The alleged victim personally informed police investiga-
tors that "[A]fter, becoming [i]ntoxicated she was talking to 
the defendant/appellant." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.22TI3, 38(26.), 41(~5), 42 (nn1&3), 46 
(n4), 77(A.), 91-92, 112; 143(h.), and 191(d.)[specifically 128 
(~n1-3]. Thereby, appellant respectfully asserts that "had either 
the court or the jury 'paid attention' to the testimony, they 
would have been able to sufficiently adduce the material and ex-
culpatory facts that the state's make-or-break/star witness .w.as __ 
not only 'intoxicated before the defendant/appellant came into the 
equation of events;' but al~o admitted that 'she only had two 
(2) drinks and had drank those drinks at the [bar] while sitting 
next to another individual' therefore the allegations the prose-
cutor was thrusting upon the defendant/appellant regarding a 
Tdate-rape-drugT being slipped in to the alleged victim's drink 
was -.- improbable." 
The appella~t asserts that ''in his (prose) MOTION FOR RECONSI~ 
DERATION which was filed before the district court [before] his 
case was DISMISSED, the arguement was made on how [pr~vious 
Postconviction counsel (Walsh) simply moved the court to WITH-
DRAW [his] MOTION ON TESTING STATE'S EVIDENCE/rape kit after 
counsel discovered that the STATE had DESTROYED the requested 
evidence -- counsel simply moved the cou~t to WITHDRAW said 
motion and permit the court to enter a SUMMARY DISMISSAL on 
appellant's postconviction application -- instead of petitioning 
the court for a CONTINUANCE and argue the unconstitutional acts 
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RELIEF,pp.38(f[f[1&(26. )-f[3), 39(f[f[1-(27.)), 41 (f[f[2-3&(31.), 42 
(f[f[1-2), 82(f[2-(A.)), 91(questions&answers), 92(f[3), 112(f[f[2-3), 
115-117, 119(1.)-120(3.)). (empasis in pleading). 
and most importantly ••• 
4.) The alleged victim personally informed police investiga-
tors that "[A]fter, becoming [i]ntoxicated she was talking to 
the defendant/appellant." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.22n3, 38(26.), 41(~5), 42 (f[f[1&3), 46 
(f[4), 77(A.), 91-92, 112, 143(h.), and 191(d.)[specifically 128 
(f[f[1-3]. Thereby, appellant respectfully asserts that "had either 
the court or the jury 'paid attention' to the testimony, they 
would have been able to sufficiently adduce the material and ex-
culpatory facts that the state's make-or-break/ star witness .w.as ... 
not only 'intoxicated before the defendant/appellant came into the 
equation of events}' but also admitted that 'she only had two 
(2) drinks and had drank those drinks at the [bar] while sitting 
next to another individual' therefore the allegations the prose-
cutor was thrusting upon the defendant/appellant regarding a 
Tdate-rape-drugT being slipped in to the alleged victim's drink 
was -.- improbable. 11 
The appellant asserts that "in his (prose) MOTION FOR RECONSI-: 
DERATION which was filed before the district court [before] his 
case was DISMISSED, the arguement was made on how [previous 
Postconviction counsel (W~lsh) simply moved the court to WITH-
DRAW [his] MOTION ON TESTING STATE'S EVIDENCE/rape kit after 
counsel discovered that the STATE ·had DESTROYED the requested 
evidence -- counsel simply moved the court to WITHDRAW said 
motion and permit the court to enter a SUMMARY DISMISSAL on 
appellant's postconviction application -- instead of petitioning 
the court for a CONTINUANCE and argue the unconstitutional acts 
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of the DESTRUCTION of physical evidence by the state under 
clearly established law of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 488, 
486,488-89, 104 s.ct. 2528,2533-34, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)(see 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,p.16(~~2-3). (emphasis in original 
pleading). 
As asserted before the district court·~· On March 27,2006, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney [Rick Baughman] forwarded his 
MEMORANDUM to the Evidence Custodian (Denise Rosen) requesting 
that "The evidence be retained (specifically the [rape kit]) 
as we feel this defendant will appeal and will request Post-
Conviction Relief. Please retain for [ at least] one ( 1) year." 
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p. 
50(~3)). 
On January 17,2008, the Idaho Court 6f Appeals issued it's 
REMITTITUR which therefore mandated that the appellant proceed 
to his Post-Convictin remedies. Thereby, the defendant/appellant 
lawfully held one (1) year to completely exhaust his Postcon-
viction remedies. 
Yet., the state took the position without notifying the defendant/ 
appellant and DESTROYED the only evidenc~ which possibly could 
. have been used to present a complete defense against the false 
allegation that "He had sexual intercourse with the proclaimed 
victim" and such conduct was "non-consentual" and therefore 
constitued [rape] under Idaho Criminal Laws. 
On March 27,2088, the Evidence Custodian-Louise Martin of the 
Couer d' Alene Police Department and Prosecutor-Denise Rosen •.. 
took it upon themselves to DESTROY the rape kit that was being 
held under their control. (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POST-CONVICrION RELIEF,p.54). 
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Appellant made a lawful and clear argument to the district court 
on the violation(s) of his constitutional rights and apparently 
the district court chose to disregard any of the argument(s) and 
the appellant's constitutional rights. (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.48-65)(empasis in original 
pleading). 
- The obligation to investigate only grows more imperative where 
the [evidence] at issue is the ]only forensic evidence] that could 
reasonabley support the defense theory. Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 
F.3d 1222,1236 (9th Cir. 2008). The central role that the poten-
tially exculpatory forensic evidence could have played in the 
defendant's/appellant's defense increased counsel's [duty] to not oaly 
seek the assistance of an expert before trial proceedings, but, 
also to seek justice in a case such as this where the state takes 
it upon themselves to destroy the only forensic evidence that 
could possibly be used to present a complete defense. Id. at 528 
F.3d 1236; Trombetta, 467 U.S., at 486-487 ("Moreover, fashioning 
remedies for the illegal destruction of evidence can pose troubling 
choices. In nondisclosure cases, a court can [grant] the defendant 
a [new trial] at which the previously suppressed evidence may be 
introduced. But, when evidence [has been destroyed] in violation 
of the Constitution, the [court] [must] choose between [barring 
further prosecution] or suppressing the state's most probative 
evidence."). Id. at 486-487. (emphasis in original). 
However, the record stands perfectly clear that at the hearing 
for the SUMMARY DISMISSAL ... previous appointed counsel for the 
Postconviction Application simply moved the Court to "WITHDRAW" 
the "MOTION FOR TESTING STATE'S EVIDENCE" rather than defend the 
defendant/appellant's constitutional rights under clearly estab~ 
lished Supreme Court law. (see MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,p.16 
(~~2-3). Const. Art. 1,§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14. 
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Appellant respectfully asserts that "It was never a 'tactical 
decision' for any of the appointed attorneys to 'pass-the-buck' 
when it came to either 'testing' the state's alleged evidence 
contained within the professed 'rape kit' and it cannot be held 
that counsel made an 'informed tactical decision' at the hearing 
for SUMMARY JUDGMENT on appellant's Postconviction Application 
and elected to simply WITHDRAW and 'let-it-rest' when the evidence 
was so constitutionally 'lacking' in a court of law." Strickland, 
466 U.S., at 668; Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,691, 106 s.ct. 
2142,2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)("Whether rooted directly in the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Con-
frontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guaran-
tees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense. 11 ). U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1, 
§13. 
Appellant further asserts that "another reason that made the 
testing(s) of the State's physical evidence more imperative for 
defense counsel was 11 
(a) During trial arguments, the court instructed defense coun-
sel (Chapman) " .•• because the [testimony] of the alleged victim 
will be that there's a [reason] for the sperm being there, and the 
doctor's testimony about the existence of sperm physically is 
[corroborative], ••. " (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF, p.74(~5.). 
(b) During trial testimony the alleged victim sat before the 
[jury] and stated the [first] time'' ••• she, did not know how long 
the suspect had his penis inside her vagina and vaginally raped 
her because, she was [knocked out]." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.105(~3) and (TT),p.329,Ls.8-13). 
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However, her [testimony] before the [jury] is factually quite 
inconsistent again -- for she clearly and specifically told 
Investigator T. Martin (Advisory Witness) during Police Investi-
gation(s) -- "The male raped her [vaginally] for approximately 
ten (10) - to - fifteen (15) minutes." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.105(ff4), 169(5.), 172 
(ff2Ls.20-22), 175, 177, 190, 191(i.), 200(ff3). (emphasis in ori-
ginals). 
Secondly, during the initial Police Investigation(s), the 
alleged victim informed Detective T. Martin (Advisory Witness) 
that: 
"[S]he was [not] wearing a [bra] -- or -- panites." (see 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, p.177 
(ff2). 
Then -- as the very same alleged victim [testified] before the 
[jury] "[S]he [was] wearing a bra and underwear." (see MEMORAN-
DUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.177 [questions 
& answers] see also p.178[questions & answers]). 
Defense counsel (Brad Chapman) knew full well what the state's 
make-or-break/star witness was going to be testifying to and had 
defense counsel actually [read] and [followed] the Police Investi-
gation Report (T. Martin) and [compared] the [contents] of the 
material/relevant evidence -- to the planned testimony -- there 
was an abundance of inconsistencies that would drive any competent 
attorney to [fully investigate] all evidence that would lead to 
the disclosure of the [truth], as well as, [expose] any planned 
[false testimony]. 
Any competent attorney could aduce this evidence. 
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Appellant asserts that "had the state's (advisory witness] 
confronted both -- the prosecutor and the state's make-or-break/ 
star witness with the actual contents contained throughout the 
investigation report (which [he] authored), the witness would 
surely have been exposed before the jury as an individual who 
was more than willing to commit [perjury] while under [oath] and 
the prosecutor would have also been exposed before the jury --
as a representative of the 'law' who was more than willing to 
commit [subordinate perjury] in order to secure a conviction with 
actual [fales testimony/evidence] time-after-time." State v. 
Terry, 1931, 50 Idaho 283, 295 P. 427 ("In perjury prosecution, 
testimony that (witness) made -- to (law enforcement officers), 
yet denied making to officers held admissible to corroborate the 
officers (advisory witness) challenges of truth."). (see also 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.177 
(~4) -- which version is the [lie] and -- which version(s) is 
the [truth] . ") • 
Appellant further asserts that "The state made a great issue(s) 
out of the [intoxication] of their alleged victim, as well as, 
had repeated [testimony] from their witness on how t[s]he floated-
in-and-out' of [consciousness] while [inside the vehicle] in 
route to the [residence]." (the record supports this fact). 
The state's witness testified before the jury on how "[S]he 
did [not remember] getting into the car in order to depart the 
bar, however, [s]he [reained•consciousness] from time-to-time 
[inside the vehicle], and testified to [n]umerous [i]nconsistent 
versions on how '[s]he [exited the vehicle] upon arrival'." 
However, neither the [prosecutor], the state's [advisory witness], 
[defense counsel], the [court], nor the [jury] apparently paid 
attention to the testimony from material eyewitness [Tamarack Y. 
McDonald]. 
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During testimony, this material eyewitness testified to the 
relevant fact(s) that "even though the alleged victim appeared to 
be intoxicated, she (victim) was more than capable to conversate, 
left the bar under her (victim's) own free will, personally [h]anded 
the car keys to the defendant/appellant, and from the 'time that 
[both] the alleged victim and the defendant/appellant 'entered in 
to the vehicle' and left the 'parking lot' of the bar -- [nothing] 
seemed to be 'wrong' with the alleged 'victim'." (see MEORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.125(c.)-135(emphasis 
on 125(c.),132(e.)-(f.),133(2.),134(~~(3-4)),135(5.-questions& 
answers)). 
Oddly, where there is [eyewitness] that can [dispute] the 
various versions the state's witness and prosecutor present to the 
[jury], there is no corroboration whatsoever as testimony is of-
fered to create evidence for the state. 
The alleged victim creates a version on how "[S]he was not con-
scious [until] 'waking inside the vehicle, being driven by an 
unknown individual -- then repeatedly 'floating in-and-out' of 
her cognative state(s) while in route to the unknown location'.'' 
The evidence creates quite an incredible scenario of events 
from the time of [d]eparture from the material eyewitness, to the 
moment of [a]rrival to the residence. Then, after [arrival] --
[consciousness] is [lost repeatedly] -- up until the law enforce-
ment officers begin to respond to the location and question the 
alleged victim. 
However, there [never] was any [testimony] on how "[e]ither 
law enforcement -or- medical personnel [provided] any type(s) 
of known [medication(s)] that caused the alleged victim to be able 
to provide detailed information, let alone [regain complete con-
sciousness and provide statements to either -- motel staff, law 
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enforcement, or medical staff." Thus, such evidence would clearly 
draw the attention of competent individuals [inside] the courtroom 
that indeed -- the [evidence] did not support the version(s) 
presented by either the [prosecutor] nor the state's [witness]. 
Thereby, this alleged evidence is not -- competent evidence, or 
draws the conclusion(s) of [proof beyond a reasonable doubt]. 
I.C.R. Rule 42(j)(2). see also I.R.E. Rule 303(b)(" ••. could find 
guilt on the [presumed fact] -- beyond a reasonable doubt."). see 
also MEMORADUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.33 
(ff4)-34(ff1),156(ffff2)-157. (emphasis in original). 
The Supreme Court has held "It necessarily follows that if the 
[omitted] evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not other-
wise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means 
that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire 
record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not 
the additional evince is considered, there is no justification for 
a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already ques-
tionable, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might 
be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." u.s-;- v~-Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97,112-113, 96 s.ct. 2392,2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). 
Appellant asserts that "Where the state made the effort to con.:;. 
tact the [Evidence custodian] and put the state's agency on 
[notice] to [preserve the rape kit] ••• " therefore such action 
makes the physical e:vidence "material" and the state agencies 
knew that the de~endant/appellant was -- expected to proceed to 
his Postconviction Remedies [before] the destruction of the only 
evidence possible for the constitutional right to both challenge 
the evidence -- and present a complete defense. 
Therefore, for all of the cumulative effects against the appel-
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lants defense, the actions of the both the state and defense 
counsel created the unconstitutional "fundamental error(s)" 
that clearly prevented the defendant/appellant from obtaining a 
[Fair Trial] in the courts of Idaho. Const. ~rt. 1,§§2&13; 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14. 
Had defense counsel simply (a) tested the alleged rape kit, 
and (b) presented the testimony of the potential inculpatory 
witness who was willing to testify before the court and jury that 
[he was] a [sexual partner] to the state's make-or-break/star 
witness who sat before both the court and jury testifying that 
"[S]he has not had sex for two (2) years" -- there most certainly 
would have been a different outcome of the trial proceedings and 
eventual conviction of one proclaiming that "[H]e did not -- have 
sexual intercourse with the self-professed victim." 
Appellant asserts that "once the state presented testimony from 
its make-or-break/star witness alleging that [she] has 'not had 
sex' for two (2) years" -- the State "Opened-The-Door" for the 
appellant to present both [his] material/fact witness to dispute 
this testimony and defense counsel was ineffective assistance of 
counsel for not providing the necessary adversarial testing to 
this false testimony and false evidence created before the jury. 
Furthermore, the State acted in "Bad Faith" when it took it 
upon itself to "destroy the evidence" long before the defendant/ 
appellant was ever issued his Remittitur and began the lawful 
process of Postconviction Relief in the appropriate courts of 
Idaho. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986); 
State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 804 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Const. Art. 1,§§2&13; U.S.C.A. Const. ~mend. 14. 
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When evidence has been lost or destroyed, courts engage in 11 a 
case-by-case assessment of the government's culpability for the 
loss, together with a realistic appraisal of its signicance when 
viewed in the light of its nature, its bearing upon critical 
issues in the case and strength of the government's [u]ntainted 
[p]roof." United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898.902 (9th Cir. 
1974); Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,541, 716 P.2d 1306,1313 
(1986). Evidence that has not been preserved by the prosecution, 
but which can be indirectly determined by [other] means, will be 
deemed material in a constitutional sense "if, viewed in rela-
tion to [all] [c]ompetent [e]vidence admitted at trial, it appears 
to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's [guilt]." 
State v. Leatherwood, 104 Idaho 100,105, 656 P.2d 760,765 (Ct. 
App. 1 982) • 
The record clearly reflects the material fact(s) that "the state 
never presented any [u]ntatinted [p]roof during the trial pro-
ceedings and the state's alleged Arape-kit' sample was the only 
evidence which the defendant/appellant could have [e]ver used to 
challenge the untruthfulness of both the state's make-or-break/ 
star witness and the prosecutor." 
Therefore, the district court failed miserably to even consider 
this vital material fact befor~ DISMISSING the defendant/appeal-
lant's SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and the 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF w/attached 
exhibits. Const. Art. 1,§§2&13; u.s.c.A. Const. Amends. 6,14. Id. 
V. STRICKLAND VIOLATION(S). 
The appellant asserts that throughout his [prose] MEMORANDUM 
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OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF and SECOND OR\ SUCCES-
SIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, he (appellant) argued allegations/ 
claims on the INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, ATTORNEY MISCON-
DUCT, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, and PREJUDICE which appellant was 
subjected to by -- not only trial counsel, but appointed counsel 
on Direct Appeal and the [numerous] appointed counsel(s) on the 
Postconviction Applications. (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.1-225; see also SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE 
POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION,pp.2(4.)-25; and MOTION FOR RECONSIDER-
ATION,pp.7-31). 
Appellant asserts pursuant to Idaho Code §19-852(b)(3) A needy 
person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under 
subsection (a) is entitled: •.••.• (3) to be represented in any 
other post-conviction or post-commitment proceeding that the 
attorney or the needy person considers appropriate, unless the 
court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is 
not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a 
[frivolous] proceeding. 
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial 
court [must] do more than determine whether the petition-alleges 
a [valid] claim. The court must also consider whether -- circum-
stances pervent the petitioner from making a [more thorough] 
investigation into the [facts]. An [indigent defendant] who is 
[incarcerated in the penitentiary] would almost [certainly] be 
[unable] to [conduct an investigation into facts not already 
contained in the court record]. Likewise, a [prose] petitioner 
may be unable to present sufficient facts showing that his or 
her counsel's performance was [deficient] or that such deficiency 
[prejudiced] the defense. That showing [will often] require the 
[assistance of someone trained in the law]. Therefore, the trial 
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court should appoint counsel if the petition [alleges facts] 
showing the -- [possibility] of a valid [claim] such that area-
sonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to [conduct further investigation] into the claim. The 
investigation by counsel may not produce evidence sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss. But, the decision to appoint counsel 
and the decision on the [merits] of the petition if counsel is 
appointed are controlled by two different standards • Swader v. 
State, 143 Idaho 651,654-55, 152 P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007). 
Thus, in determining whether [appellant] raised the "possibility 
of a valid claim,'' the court(s) consider whether the appointment 
of counsel [would have assisted] him in conducting an investigation 
into facts not in the record. 
If the appellant did not raise the [possibility of a valid 
claim], the district court's error did not effect his substantial 
rights. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 counsels: "The court at 
every stage of the proceeding [must disregard] any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the [substantial rights] 
of the parties." 
The appellant respectfully asserts that "He, raised sufficient 
claims before the district court where the [reord] amply supports 
that appellant was indeed 'convicted on [false testimony/evidence]' 
which more than sufficiently been discoverable not just through 
the court record(s), but also, by [comparing the POLICE REPORTS, 
the MEDICAL REPORTS, and the ST.A.TEMENTS (by material/fact eye-
witnesses)] to the true contents of statements made by pertinent 
witnesses, and those very statements made by the state's make-or-
break/star witness which does [not] coincide to the testimony 
and creation of evidence throughout the criminal trial proceedings." 
Respectfully "How many [lies] does it take to IMPEACH? 11 
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Appellant presented before the district court ample allegations/ 
claims of the INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, ATTORNEY MISCON-
DUCT, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, and PREJUDICE which he (appellant) 
suffered from appointed counsel throughout [every stage of liti-
gation] which requires [competent assistance] of an attorney 
acting as his [diligent conscientious [a]dvocate]. State v. Tucker, 
97 Idaho 4,8, 539 P.2d 556,560 (1975); State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 
727,728, 620 P.2d 300,301 (1980); State v. Huck, 124 Idaho 155, 
157-58, 857 P.2d 634,636-37 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Appellant asserts that absolutely none of the appointed attorneys 
representing his cause ever raised the allegations/claims of which 
he (appellant) has tried on numerous ocassions to address the courts 
on and reach a meaningful adjudication on the mertis of the cumu-
lative fundamental errors. 
A good- example of this is, the appellant presented the district 
court with a indication of "material and factual eyewitnesses" 
which defense counsel (Brad Chapman) totally failed to interv~ew 
and gather additional vital information to subject the state's case 
to a [meaningful adversarial testing] regardless of clearly es-
tablished law(s) under not only the Strickland standard, but also 
under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. see Lord v. Wood, 
184 F.3d 1083, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1995)("holding that counsel's 
failure to call [key witnesses] whose [testimony] undermined the 
prosecutor's case [c]onstituted [deficient performance]."); 
Rio~·v; Rocha, ~299 F:3d 796,805 (9th-Ci~~ 2002)("The·f~il~i~ to~· 
investigate is especially egregious when a defense attorney fails 
to consider [potentially exculpatory evidence]."; Harris v. Wood, 
64 F.3d 1432,1435-37 (9th Cir. 1995)("Holding that 'counsel's' 
failure to retain an investigator and [i]nterview many of the 
[individuals indentified in the 'police reports') was [d)eficient 
performance.") . ( emphasis in originals) • 
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The decision to [impeach] a witness is a tactical decision. 
State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149,152, 609 P.2d 1140,1143 (1980); 
see also State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170,174, 857 P.2d 649,653 (Ct. 
App. 1993). Likewise, the decision of what [evidence] should be 
introduced at trial is also tactical. Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 
34,38, 121 P.3d 965,969 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's 
[evidence] has raised [no genuine issue of material fact] that, 
if resolved in the applicant's favor, would [entitle] the applicant 
to the requested relief. A "material fact" has some [logical con-
nection] with the [consequential facts], Black's Law Dictionary, 
991 (7th Ed. 1999), and therefore is determined by the relationship 
to the legal theories presented by the parties. If such a [factual 
issue is presented], an evidentiary hearing [m]ust be (c]onducted. 
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763, 819 P.2d 1159,1163 (Ct. App. 
1 991). 
The district court concluded that appellant's application held 
meree [conclusory allegations], unsupported by [admissible evi-
dence], or the appellant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Appellant asserts, as to [conclusory] allegations. The district 
court clearly concluded that [no supporting evidence] was offered. 
As to [unsupported by admissible evidence], the appellant 
asserts that -- the POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, STATEMENTS 
(by material eyewitnesses to police), and all of the attached 
exhibits to the MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF are "all" supporting evidence and lawfully are material 
evidence which any court would permit entry to the record during 
trial proceedings before the [jury] for deterrnination(s) of the 
[facts] before them. 
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Appellant respectfully asserts that "if the district court would 
have taken the effort to [c]ompare both the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE 
POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF w/attached supporting exhibits ••• there 
would indeed have been both [supporting] and [admissible] evidence 
to the lawful conclusion(s) that the appellant indeed -- did 
raise a genuine issue of material fact with evidence that would 
support the allegation/claim(s) that appellant was [c]onvicted 
with false testimony/evidence in violation of his constitutional 
rights." 
Had the district court [c]ompared the POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL 
REPORTS, and STATEMENTS (from material eyewitnesses) to the true 
testimony and evidence presented to the jury -- there would have 
sufficient conclusion(s) drawn that the state's make-or-break/star 
witness was so inconsistent with her testimony, as well as, the 
relevant fact that "there never was any material eyewitnesses to 
coroborate the allegations" yet, there were indeed an abundance 
of material eyewitnesses that lawfully [disputed] the testimony/ 
evidence the state's make-or-break/star witness and the prosecutor 
orchestrated before the court and jury. 
The variety of POLICE REPORTS are inconsistent to trial testimony, 
the MEDICAL REPORTS never indicate any corroboration of a woman 
who was violently physically and sexually assaulted, and the 
STATEMENTS further disputed all of the testimony the alleged vic-
tim provided before the court and jury. 
Case in point -- how many different versions can one alleged 
victim create regarding the [exit] of the vehicle upon arrival? 
How many different versions can one alleged victim create re-
garding the physical and sexual assault(s)? How many different 
versions can one alleged victim create to a [rape] scenario? 
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One moment the state's make-or-break/star witness testifies 
before the jury that "She had only two (2) drinks" then both the 
witness and prosecutor create a scenario on how the alleged vic-
tim "took a drink to the [t]able" after testimony of how "she 
drank both drinks [at the bar] while sitting with another in-
dividaul." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF,pp.116-121 ). (emphasis in Trial Transcript/Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript). see also MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.122; 164-167; 171-179). 
Furthermore, the MEDICAL REPORTS indicate "a slight abrasion on 
the face." Yet, during trial, the state's make-or-break/star wit-
ness clearly explains a relevant fact ••• "one moment she falls 
on what felt like a garbage -- a garbage bag 'full of cans' •.• 
then changes testimony to 'not remembering stumbling, tripping, 
or falling on [anything] that evening'." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.193-194). Oddly, none 
of the MEDICAL REPORTS corroborate any allegation(s) of the alleged 
victim "complaining of being repeatedly 'knocked-out' three (3) 
times.~· 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 
applicant must satisfy a two-part test. The applicant must prove, 
first, that the attorney's performance was [deficient] and second, 
that the applicant was [prejudiced] by the deficiency. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687; Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316, 900 P.2d 22q, 
224 (Ct. App. 1995). 
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE: 
The appellant asserts that any competent attorney would have 
provided reasonable professional assistance. However, the record, 
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the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, and the 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF all pro-
vided the district court with an abundance of allegations/ 
claims that clearly reflect that absolutely no appointed attorney 
provided assistance coming close to ~reasonable profession~l 
assistanceu during the course(s) of both litigation and represen-
tation. 
A strong point in case is -- any competent attorney would have 
at least gone out and conducted an investigation on the material: 
fact eyewitnesses who were unamed throughout the cumulative Police 
Investigation(s) Reports and provided most vital testimony before 
the jury in the defense of his needy client." Everybit of the 
information was relevant evidence which the record exhibits was 
never pres~nted to the court(s) or jury. 
Appellant asserts that "not only did all of his appointed attor-
neys fail to satisfy the requirements of the Strickland standard, 
every attorney falied to satisfy the American Bar Association 
Standards 4-4.1 and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct as 
well." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, 
pp.204-211). The record supports the material/relevant fact(s) 
that "none of these material eyewitnesses were ever -- investigated 
or presented before the court(s) and jury and defense counsel 
(Chapman) holds no justification(s) for such incompetent actions. 
Lord v. Wootj, 184 F.3d 1083,1095-96 (9th Cir. 1995); Rios v. Rocha, 
299 F.3d 796,805 (9th Cir. 2002); Harris v. wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 
1435-37 (9th Cir. 1995) et al. 
Defense attorneys do not have a duty to interview all potential 
witnesses. State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,424, 776 P.2d 424,433 
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(1989); State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250,258, 858 P.2d 789,797 (Ct. 
App. 1993). However, under some circumstances such a failure can 
constitute a deficiency in representation. Each case must be judged 
according to the significance of the evidence the witness has to 
offer and what other sources are available to ascertain the tes-
timony of the witness. In view of the potential importance of 
information ~eld by all of the named material/relevant eyewitnesses 
which lawfully would have disproved numerous components of the 
State's case and testimony against the appellant, this court must 
be able to conclude that "it was patently unreasonable for appel-
lant's attorneys not to pursue the vital and controlling matters 
with each material eyewitness." 
For the only alleged evidence the State held to take the appel-
lant to trial and secure the conviction was -- an untruthful make-
or-break/star witness and an alleged [rape kit] sample that was 
alleged by the state's make-or-break/star witness to contain the 
[sperm sam?le] from the defendant/appellant without any Scientific 
testing(s) whatsoever for the State to meet its burden of proof 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" on each element of contempt. I.C.R.-
Rule 42(j) (2). 
PREJUDICE: 
Regardless of [all] of the "hidden material/relevant evidence" 
which was never [entered] in to evidence, or, [p]resented before 
the court(s) and [jury] for the duty of finding guilt based on 
[all of the evidence] beyond a reasonable doubt, every appointed 
attorney from the trial -to- direct appeal -to- postconviction 
proceedings the defendant/appellant was forced to endure the 
prejudicial conduct from his attorneys. 
The conduct of all -- appointed attorneys -- cannot lawfully be 
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determined to be that of ''informed tactical decision(s) pursuant 
to clearly established Supreme Court or Idaho Supreme Court law(s).'' 
The other sources that were available to ascertain the testimony 
of the sate's make-or-break/star witness and the presentation(s) 
of the state's case was indeed - "suppressed" by not only the 
prosecutor, but, by the state's advisory witness (Detective T. 
Martin) and defense counsel (Brad Chapman), as well as, direct 
appeal counsel and all postconviction relief attorneys. 
Therefore, the material/relevant -- suppressed evidence justi-
fies a "Conspiracy" to violate the defendant/appellant's constitu-
tional rights. "The right to offer the [testimony of witnesses] 
.•.• is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right 
to present the defendant's version of the facts •..• [The accused] 
has the right to present his won witnesses to establish a defense. 
This right is a fundamental element of [due process] of law. 11 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,19, 87 s.ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1967). When the evidence is excluded on the basis of an unconsti-
tuional act(s) of either the state -or- appointed counsel, due 
process concerns are still greater because the exclusion is un-
supported by any legitimate judicial justification(s). Unite States 
v, Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583,588 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Defense counsel's (Brad Chapman) creation of a defense to the 
[rape charge] was that -- "The alleged victim -- screamed 'rape' 
solely because she (alleged victim) felt the defendant/appellant 
stole her vehicle." 
There is and was absolutely no evidence contained throughout the 
POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, STATEMENTS {1from material eye-
witnesses)that would logically support such an incompetent and 
idiotic defense when so much material/relevant evidence laid hid-
den away by the state and defense counsel (Brad Chapman). 
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Factually, there is indeed a "material eyewitness" who could 
lawfully "dispute" the theory created by defense counsel, yet, 
defense counsel elected to "ignore the [e]vidence and create a 
bogus theory contrary to any evidence throughout the case. (see 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.206(1"[ 
f.)-207(f[~1-2; see also pp.208(1"[5.)-210(1"[1)). The record fully 
supports the material and probative fact(s) that neither one of 
these vital material witnesses were ever "interviewed", let alone 
testified before the court(s) or [jury]. Thereby, the defendant/ 
appellant was indeed "prejudiced" by such failure(s) from defense 
counsel (Brad Chapman) and the pathetic defense theory that was 
concocted. 
Defendant/Appellant never once "waived" any type(s) of his 
constitutional rights or lawful defenses at any time(s) during any 
of the representations from appointed counsel whether during all 
the criminal proceedings, the direct appeal proceedings, or all 
-- of the postconviction relief proceedings. Every appointed attor-
ney took it upon themselves to select the defenses - to - all of 
the issues to be selectively raised during direct appeal and all 
of the postconviction relief proceedings. There never was any form 
of "communication between attorney and client" as the record will 
clearly reflect. 
In reality, there is little or no way for the defendant/appel-
lant to know whether he has been adequately represented during any 
proceeding(s). Only when [a]nother [trained lawyer] reviews the 
record and the entire proceedings can it be determined if there 
are valid [claims] based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Sadly, it took the appellant and two (2) jailhouse lawyers to 
sit of sift through the record and discover the unconstitutional 
acts of "all appointed counsel" and the material fact(s) that the 
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hauled into a courtroom, tried, convicted, and sentenced to the 
state penitentiry -- behind nothing but "false testimony" and 
"false evidence" all while the representatives of the law hid the 
evidence that was lawfully both -- inculpatory to the state's make-
or-break/star witness -- and exculpatory for the defendant/appel-
lant. The record supports this claim made before this Honorable 
Court. 
The defects in the defendant/appellant's trial were the direct 
result(s) of the [prosecutor's] pretrial constitutional failure(s) 
to guard against improbity in the trial process, a failure which 
rendered the trial itself patently [unfair] in due process terms. 
The prosecutor saw fit without prophylaxis to call to the stand 
its make-or-break/star witness whom was more than willing to lie 
under oath and follow the orchestration of the prosecutor in order 
to secure the conviction. The manner in which the trial unfolded 
leaves the definite conviction that the process itself lacked 
fundamental fairness and delivered a palpably unreliable result. 
Appellant asserts that "Neither the State, nor any appointed 
Counsel has ever stood before any Court(s) in Idaho and explained 
any of their unconstitutional deeds subjected upon the defendant/ 
appellant." 
The appellant asserts that "He has amply litigated both [d]efi-
ciancy and prejudice thrusted upon him by the judicial representa-
tives from criminal trial - up to - appellant's [prose] represen-
tation and litigation(s) attempts." When, on appeal, the discovery 
of an illegal conviction and sentence, no courts, can allow such 
unconstitutional acts to [s]tand -- uncorrected. King v. State, 
114 Idaho 442,447, 757 P.2d 705,710 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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CONCLUSION 
For th~ foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully asserts 
that he has ~uffered from the effects of. ineffective assistance 
of counsel. The district court Is D~:tNIA:L:of the SECOND OR SUCCES-
SIVE POSTCONVICTION.APPLICATION, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
POSTCONVICTION R,ELIEF, MOTroN :f'.OR RECONSIDERATION, and MOTION 
FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING w/the ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL must be 
REVERSED. Thi'S· ·!I0no~ao],,e court· to REMAND to the district court 
and ORDER that the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICA-
TION be ISSUED and a EVIDENTIARY HEARING be CONDUCTED within 
ninty (90) days, if not sooner. 
Furthermore, the Appellant seeks full compensation for [all] 
litigation cost(s) pretaining to this APPEAL. 
DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY 
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the United 
States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. 
28 u.s.c., §1746; 18 u.s.c. §1621. 
Respectfully submitted this ,;:79 t_/2 day of0CWl:FR._ , 201 4. 
Executed at: Idaho Correctional Institution - Orofino 
prose. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this~day 
of~~ 
RONALD RAY HENRY 
REG. NO. 81634 
ICIO 




N tary Publ'c for Idaho 
~,&, 26 o)_0/1 
ommission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
/)yl!, ~, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0 - day of ljCm/3f/:. , 2014, I 
delivered to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing a true 
and correct copy of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF via prison mail system 
for process to the U.S. mail system to: 
Lawrence G. Wadsen 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise,ID. 83720-0010 
Clerk Of The Courts 
Supreme Court - Court Of Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise,ID. 83720-0101 
RONALD RAY HENRY,pro se 
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381 W. HOSPITAL DR. 
OROFINO,ID. 83544 
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